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Transformation, Copyright Infringement, and Fair Use 
Prof. James Gibson, University of Richmond School of Law 
September 30, 2014 
A small copyright decision out of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit last month 
has gotten a big reaction from copyright experts.  The case is Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, and it 
involves an entertaining set of facts. 
In the 1960s, there was a young University of Wisconsin student named Paul Soglin, who had an 
anti-authoritarian streak.  He led a number of demonstrations on issues ranging from civil rights 
to the Vietnam War.  Indeed, one particular Vietnam protest, in May 1969, led to his arrest for 
failure to obey a police officer.  That same protest became an annual event, eventually morphing 
into what is known as the Mifflin Street Block Party. 
Fast forward half a century, and Soglin is now the mayor of Madison, Wisconsin, hometown to 
his alma mater.  The Mifflin Street Block Party is still happening every year, but Soglin is no 
longer a fan of unruly street gatherings, and in fact he called for an end to the event he helped 
originate.  In response, a cheeky Wisconsin apparel business – Sconnie Nation LLC1 – started 
selling a t-shirt that poked fun at Soglin’s new, grumpier attitude.  The t-shirt featured a high-
contrast image of Soglin’s face, in stark yellow on a black background, with “Sorry For 
Partying” written around it in large, stylized script. 
This is where intellectual property law makes an appearance.  The t-shirt image was derived 
from the city’s official portrait of its mayor, which was a color photograph by professional 
photographer and longtime Soglin supporter Michael Kienitz.  Sconnie Nation had downloaded 
the photo from the city’s website and then altered it, removing much of the detail and rendering 
it in two colors – yellow and black.  (The original photo and the stylized version on the t-shirt 
can be seen here.)  Soglin was not amused by this mockery, and he contacted Kienitz to tell him 
of this unauthorized use of the photo.  Kienitz then registered a copyright in the photo and sued 
Sconnie Nation for copyright infringement. 
The case eventually reached the Seventh Circuit, which issued a short and breezy 
opinion authored by influential jurist Frank Easterbrook.  The court ruled in favor of Sconnie 
Nation, holding that its use of Kienitz’s photo was a fair use.  But seemed to reach that 
conclusion reluctantly, suggesting several arguments that might have been fruitful had Kienitz 
made them, and excoriating a sister circuit’s more liberal approach to fair use, which relies more 
heavily on whether the defendant’s use was “transformative.” 
Reasonable people can disagree about the importance of “transformative use” within fair use 
jurisprudence, although the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on fair use certainly 
put the concept front and center.  But to my mind the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Kienitz v. 
Sconnie Nation is more interesting in what it does not say than in what it does.  You see, the oral 
argument in the case focused primarily on an issue that Judge Easterbrook does not even 
mention: whether there was any infringement in the first place.  After all, fair use is a defense to 
copyright infringement – which means that if there is no infringement, there is no need to argue 
fair use at all. 
Let us give that issue the attention that the court did not.  First, how does one determine whether 
there is a prima faciecase for infringement?  The Supreme Court has told us: Look to see if the 
defendant’s allegedly infringing work involves copying of “constituent elements of the 
[plaintiff’s] work that are original.”  So what’s original about a photograph?  Not the features of 
the photo’s subject, surely. Those originate with the photographee, not the photographer.  But 
subjective decisions about such issues as angle, lighting, and focus can be original to the 
photographer.  Those are the photographer’s art. 
Second, how do those standards apply to the facts of the Kienitz case?  The Seventh Circuit 
opinion gives us some hints.  For example, Judge Easterbrook says that, after Sconnie Nation 
was done transforming the work, “What is left, besides a hint of Soglin’s smile, is the outline of 
his face, which can’t be copyrighted.”  But if that is the case, why situate the analysis in the fair 
use doctrine at all?  If the parts of Kienitz’s photo that were copied are not the original, 
copyrightable parts, then we’re done.  There’s no need to consider applicable defenses like fair 
use. 
Perhaps the court decided that the fair use outcome was more certain, and so assumed for the 
sake of argument that there was infringement.  It’s not uncommon for judges to skip a difficult 
issue in order to reach a later, more clearly dispositive one.2  Yet that does not seem to be the 
court’s reason for abandoning the prima facie inquiry that occupied so much of the oral 
argument.  Indeed, in both the oral argument and the written opinion, Judge Easterbrook was 
dismissive of the argument that any original elements of the photos survived in the t-shirt.  It 
seems like the court could have gone with that argument instead. 
I would suggest, however, that the court may have made the right choice after all, because Judge 
Easterbrook’s comments on the plaintiff’s prima facie case were arguably overly simplistic.  Did 
the process of making the photo into a cruder, high-contrast image really eliminate the photo’s 
original elements, as he implied?  There’s an argument that it did just the opposite: that a lot of 
what was left over in the new version was the angle and shading and lighting (which represent 
the photographer’s art), rather than Soglin’s wrinkles and other detailed facial features (which do 
not).  An even more interesting example is the famous Obama Hope poster, which used multiple 
colors to preserve a lot of the shading in the underlying photograph, even as it made it highly 
stylized. 
One final thought.  There is another way to end this sort of litigation at the prima facie stage, and 
that’s to say that choosing a particular angle, focus, and lighting in a routine snapshot is not 
original enough in the first place.  After all, another necessary element to prove prima 
facie infringement is “ownership of a valid copyright.”  A more demanding originality standard 
would preserve copyright protection for Alfred Stieglitz, Annie Leibovitz, and Ansel Adams, but 
not clutter up the Internet with copyright protection for the millions of images that take not a 
moment’s thought to compose and capture.  But current law gives us a very permissive 
originality standard – and with it, we get increased importance for doctrines like fair use. 
© 2014 James Gibson 
 
1. Sconnie Nation makes apparel and accessories that celebrate Wisconsin.  “Sconnie” is a term 
of endearment that describes anyone who is from Wisconsin or who just really likes cheese. 
2. Note that, over time, there may be a cost to skipping directly to fair use, even if the doctrine 
clearly favors the defendant.  When courts do not make a plaintiff show that there was 
infringement, that can put undue weight on the fair use doctrine as the silver bullet for all of 
copyright’s problems – making earlier parts of the plaintiff’s case, on which it bears the burden 
of proof, seem pro forma. 
